The diversity of influenza A viruses in swine (swIAVs) presents an important pandemic threat. Knowledge of the human-swine interface is particularly important for understanding how viruses with pandemic potential evolve in swine hosts. Through phylogenetic analysis of contemporary swIAVs in the United States, we demonstrate that human-to-swine transmission of pandemic H1N1 
S
wine are considered an important reservoir for the evolution of influenza A viruses (IAVs) with pandemic potential, owing to their high capacity to generate novel viruses via reassortment between cocirculating lineages (1) . However, in recent years it has become apparent that humans frequently transmit IAVs to swine, and how important this process of "reverse zoonosis" is in the long-term evolution of IAV genetic diversity in swine (2) . Of particular note is the number of times humans have transmitted pandemic H1N1 influenza A (pH1N1) viruses to swine on multiple continents since 2009 (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) . A global estimate of 49 discrete introductions of pH1N1 viruses from humans to swine from 2009 to 2012 is likely an underestimate (9) , and increased surveillance efforts in swine continue to identify additional introductions of pH1N1 viruses from humans to swine globally (10) .
The genetic diversity of swine influenza A viruses (swIAVs) is monitored continuously in the United States by voluntary and anonymous submissions to the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). Currently, there are at least 7 antigenically distinct hemagglutinin (HA) segment lineages circulating in U.S. swine: H3, H1-␣, H1-␤, H1-␥, H1-␦1, H1-␦2, and H1-pdm (the HA segment of pH1N1 viruses) (11) . At least 4 distinct neuraminidase (NA) segment lineages are found in U.S. swine: N2-1998, N2-2002, N1-classical, and N1-pdm (the NA segment of pH1N1 viruses). During 2011, there was a marked drop in the proportion of USDA submissions of H1-pdm and N1-pdm. From the fourth quarter of 2009 (2009-Q4) to 2011-Q1, ϳ20% (88/422) and ϳ23% (89/376) of sequenced HA and NA segments were H1-pdm and N1-pdm, respectively, whereas these proportions dropped to Ͻ4% (25/749 for HA; 25/658 for NA) from 2011-Q2 to 2012-Q4 (11) .
However, in 2014, there was a noticeable uptick in H1-pdm and N1-pdm submissions to the USDA. A possible explanation for the increase could involve fitness gains associated with balancing immune selection or reassortment between H1-pdm and N1-pdm and other genome segments. Alternatively, it was asked whether humans could be the source of the 2014 H1-pdm and N1-pdm segments in swine. To further understand the evolution of pH1N1 viruses in U.S. swine, and to resolve the origins of the 2014 H1-pdm and N1-pdm segments in particular, we conducted a largescale phylogenetic analysis of sequence data from human and swine pH1N1 viruses collected from 2009 to 2014. We found that the 2014 H1-pdm and N1-pdm segments represent new introductions of pH1N1 viruses from humans, emphasizing the continued importance of human-to-swine transmission in the evolution of IAV in U.S. swine herds.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Influenza virus sample preparation and sequencing. Three genes (HA, NA, and M) of the swine isolates were sequenced by the contributing USDA National Animal Health Laboratory Network veterinary diagnostic laboratory and submitted to GenBank (accession numbers for HA and NA are listed in Table 1 and in Tables S2 and S3 in the supplemental  material) . Following the identification of HAs that were pH1N1, a subsample of the swine isolates were subjected to whole-genome sequencing. The whole-genome next-generation sequencing was performed using the Ion 316 v2 chip and Ion PGM 200 v2 sequencing kit (Life Technologies, Carlsbad, CA) as previously described (12) .
Phylogenetic analysis of global pandemic H1N1 viruses in swine. As a global context for this study, we first inferred a maximum-likelihood (ML) phylogenetic tree for 2,347 HA (H1-pdm) sequences from human and swine IAVs collected globally from 2009 to 2014. The data set included all available swine H1-pdm sequences (n ϭ 548) and, as background, human H1-pdm sequences that were subsampled from oversampled years (e.g., 2009) (n ϭ 1,799 total human sequences). Since relatively few human viruses from more recent years were available for 2014 from the Influenza Virus Resource at GenBank (13), 100 sequences from human viruses collected during 2014 were obtained from the GISAID Epiflu database (http://platform.gisaid.org) and used as background (see Table S1 in the supplemental material). Each segment was aligned separately using MUSCLE v3.8.1 (14) . The phylogenetic relationships of these data were inferred using the ML method available in the program RAxML v7.2.6 (15), incorporating a general time-reversible (GTR) model of nucleotide substitution with a gamma-distributed (⌫) rate variation among sites. To assess the robustness of each node, a bootstrap resampling process was performed (500 replicates), again using the ML method available in RAxML v7.2.6.
Phylogenetic analysis of pandemic H1N1 viruses in swine in the United States. To explore the evolution of pH1N1 viruses in U.S. swine in greater detail, we generated data sets of nucleotide sequences from humans and swine collected in the United States from 2009 to 2014 for three segments: H1-pdm (n ϭ 173 swine and 760 human sequences) (see Table  S2 in the supplemental material), N1-pdm (n ϭ 178 swine and 688 human sequences) (see Table S3 in the supplemental material), and NP-pdm (n ϭ 206 swine and 221 human sequences) (see Table S4 in the supplemental material). Phylogenetic relationships were inferred for each of the three data sets using the time-scaled Bayesian approach using the Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) method available in the BEAST v1.8.0 package (16) and the high-performance computational capabilities of the Biowulf Linux cluster at the National Institutes of Health, Bethesda, MD (http://biowulf.nih.gov). A relaxed uncorrelated lognormal (UCLN) molecular clock was used, with a flexible Bayesian skyline plot (BSP) demographic prior (10 piecewise constant groups), and a general-time reversible (GTR) model of nucleotide substitution with gamma-distributed rate variation among sites. The MCMC chain was run separately three times for each of the data sets for at least 100 million iterations with subsampling every 10,000 iterations, using the BEAGLE library to improve computational performance (17) . All parameters reached convergence, as assessed visually using Tracer v.1.6, with statistical uncertainty reflected in values of the 95% highest posterior density (HPD). At least 10% of the chain was removed as burn in, and runs for the same lineage and segment were combined using LogCombiner v1.8.0 and downsampled to generate a final posterior distribution of 1,000 trees that was used in subsequent analyses.
To more quantitatively characterize the direction and timing of the exchange of pandemic viruses between humans and swine in the United States, we adapted a phylogeographic approach, using host and temporal information as our "location states. senting the ancestral history of the viral population. These transitions are referred to as Markov jump counts (18) and have commonly been used in the context of phylogeography to identify discrete viral movements between spatial locations. Here, we extend this application to estimate successful introductions of virus from one host to another. For computational efficiency, the phylogeographic analysis was run using an empirical distribution of 1,000 trees, allowing the MCMC chain to be run for 25 million iterations, sampling every 1,000. A Bayesian stochastic search variable selection (BSSVS) was employed to improve statistical efficiency for all data sets containing more than four location states. Maximum clade credibility (MCC) trees were summarized using TreeAnnotator v1. (13) were used in the analysis (viruses collected by surveillance targeting U.S. agricultural fairs were removed from the analysis due to the high number of identical sequences). Trees were inferred for each segment, and for the H1, H3, N1, and N2 subtypes separately, using the ML methods described above (15) . For the PB2, PB1, PA, NP, MP, and NS internal gene segments, viruses were categorized as triple reassortant (trig) or pandemic (pdm). The HA segments were categorized as H1-␥, H1-␦1, H1-␦2, H1-pdm, or H3. The NA segments were categorized as N2-1998, N2-2002, N1-classical, or N1-pdm. Of the 470 viruses, 26 had eight pH1N1 segments and were not reassortants, and they were removed from subsequent analyses of reassortment. Nucleotide sequence accession numbers. The sequences described were submitted to GenBank under the accession numbers given in Table 1 .
RESULTS

Evolution of H1-pdm in swine globally from 2009 to 2014.
A phylogenetic tree was inferred using ML methods for the 2,347 H1-pdm segments collected in humans and swine globally (see Fig. S1 in the supplemental material). The tree is consistent with global phylogenies inferred previously with fewer swIAV data (9) . Human-to-swine transmission of pandemic H1N1 influenza viruses occurred an estimated 133 times on a global scale from 2009 to 2014. This estimate is based on a definition of a transmission event as a monophyletic cluster of swine viruses with bootstrap values of Ն70 and singleton viruses, using methods similar to those used previously to estimate the number of introductions of human pH1N1 viruses into swine (9) . This estimate is conservative, and numerous additional putative human-to-swine transmission events were apparent on the tree that did not qualify by our strict definition. A lack of spatial structuring of pH1N1 viruses in humans is evidence of extensive global migration of pH1N1 viruses via human movement. In contrast, the 133 defined clusters of pH1N1 viruses in swine remain strongly spatially structured by country, indicating that, to date, pH1N1 viruses have not disseminated via swine across national boundaries. Rather, separate human introductions into swine were observed on six continents in countries including Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Cameroon, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, England, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Japan, Mexico, Nigeria, Russia, Spain, Sri Lanka, South Korea, Thailand, the United States, and Vietnam. The fact that pH1N1 viruses found in U.S. swine were not related to pH1N1 viruses found in swine in other countries, including Canada, allowed us to restrict subsequent analyses to U.S. data only.
Evolution of the H1-pdm and N1-pdm segments in U.S. swine from 2009 to 2014. For a more refined understanding of pH1N1 evolution in U.S. swine herds, MCC trees were inferred for the H1-pdm and N1-pdm segments of viruses collected from swine and humans in the United States (the HA tree is shown in Fig. 1 , the HA tree with tip labels is available in Fig. S2 in the supplemental material, and the NA tree with tip labels in Fig. S3 in the supplemental material; accession numbers are listed in Tables  S2 and S3 in the supplemental material). The human pH1N1 viruses are strongly structured temporally (ladderlike), in the HA and NA phylogenies. Human viruses from the 2009 pandemic reside in the lower left portion of the phylogeny, and human viruses from the 2013-2014 epidemic are positioned at the upper right (Fig. 1, orange box) , with viruses from intervening years positioned in the middle of the tree. This structured pattern of human viruses greatly facilitates inference of the timing of each human-to-swine transmission event, even in the case of long branch lengths between human and swine viruses. For example, all 2014 swIAVs on the H1-pdm tree (n ϭ 20) (Fig. 1 , purple, and Table 1 ) are positioned within the clade of human viruses collected during the 2013-2014 U.S. epidemic and are most likely to represent IAV transmission events from humans to swine that occurred during the 2013-2014 epidemic ( Fig. 1; see Fig. S2 in the supplemental material). The number of times that the virus was transmitted from humans to U.S. swine during the 2013-2014 epidemic is estimated to be ϳ10 to 12, with the lower end of the range based on clades supported by high bootstrap values and singletons on the ML tree (see Fig. S1 in the supplemental material) and the higher end of the range based on Markov jumps on the MCC tree ( Fig. 1; see Fig. S2 in the supplemental material) . Of the 20 HA-pdm swIAV sequences available for 2014, whole-genome sequences were also available for 13. All 13 wholly sequenced viruses had 8 pH1N1 segments, with no evidence of reassortment with other swIAVs (Table 1 ). This pattern is consistent with the recent introduction of these 2014 H1-pdm segments from humans, as the full pH1N1 genome has not been conserved long term in U.S. swine owing to frequent reassortment (see below).
The evolutionary dynamics of the H1-pdm and N1-pdm segments prior to 2014 are more complex, representing a combination of human-to-swine transmission events that occurred during the initial waves of the 2009 H1N1 pandemic but did not sustain onward transmission in swine, as well as a number of human-toswine transmission events from the same period that continued to be transmitted in swine for at least several years. S2 , purple arrow, in the supplemental material). In contrast, swIAVs in this lower section of the tree that were collected in later years (e.g., A/swine/Illinois/A01395201/2013/H1N1, collected 18 November 2013) represent human-to-swine transmission events that also occurred during the major U.S. fall/winter pandemic wave of 2009 and 2010 but continued to be successfully transmitted onward in swine (see Fig. S2 , orange arrow, in the supplemental material). Onward transmission in swine is evidenced by highly supported monophyletic clades containing only swine viruses (100% posterior support in the case of A/swine/Illinois/A01395201/2013/H1N1) and long branch lengths. Onward virus transmission in swine is distinguishable from multiple independent introductions of similar human viruses, which would be represented on the tree by clades containing a mixture of human and swine viruses.
Markov jump counts representing host switches on the tree were used to summarize the proportion of all swIAVs that were recently introduced from humans, distinguishable from viruses that represent onward transmission in pigs across seasons. Annotating each virus by host (swine or human), as well as by season (2009-2010, 2010-2011, 2011-2012, 2012-2013 , and 2013-2014 seasonal epidemics, defined as September to August), provides additional information about the likely timing of each human-toswine transmission event, which may have occurred many years prior to the sampling of the virus in pigs. The patterns of inferred Markov jump counts were similar for the H1-pdm and N1-pdm segments, with higher estimates of human-to-swine transmission than onward swine-to-swine transmission for both of the seg- ments. Markov jump counts for the representative N1-pdm are visualized in Fig. 2a , and the H1-pdm heat map is provided in Fig.  S4 in the supplemental material. Based on these counts, it is estimated that almost 100 human-to-swine transmission events occurred in the United States from 2009 to 2014 (see Tables S5 and  S6 in the supplemental material).
Each heat map is divided into quadrants that represent four routes of transmission. Quadrant I of the N1-pdm (Fig. 2a) and H1-pdm (see Fig. S4 in the supplemental material) heat maps represents human-to-human transmission, which follows a diagonal pattern, as expected, with each epidemic's viral population reseeded primarily from the preceding year's epidemic in humans. Although only U.S. data were used in the analysis, these data should be considered to represent a global gene pool for human viruses, with viruses in the United States reseeded by global diversity in each epidemic (19) . Quadrant II represents virus transmission from humans to swine. Quadrant II also has a diagonal pattern that reflects how most human and swine viruses associated with a human-to-swine transmission event are collected during the same season, which again is expected. Due to the somewhat arbitrary definition of influenza season in the Northern Hemisphere (September to August), some swine viruses were related to human viruses from what was defined as the previous season. For example, a large number of swIAVs from the 2010-2011 season were related to human viruses from the 2009-2010 season. As expected, very little swine-to-human transmission was observed in these data (Fig. 2, quadrant III) . Surprisingly, however, relatively little onward swine-to-swine transmission of the N1-pdm or H1-pdm segment was observed, particularly after 2011 (Fig. 2a , quadrant IV; see Fig. S4 in the supplemental material) .
Evolution of NP-pdm segments in U.S. swine from 2009 to 2014. The pandemic internal genes were found to be evolving differently from the H1-pdm and N1-pdm segments, as reflected by the much higher rates of onward swine-to-swine transmission evident on the representative NP heat map ( Fig. 2b; For clarity, each heat map has been divided into four quadrants that represent linkages between human viruses from a seasonal epidemic and human viruses from a different (usually preceding) epidemic (i.e., human-to-human transmission) (I), linkages between swine viruses from a seasonal epidemic and human viruses from a different (usually preceding) epidemic (i.e., human-to-swine transmission) (II), linkages between human viruses and swine viruses (i.e., swine-to-human transmission) (III), and linkages between swine viruses and swine viruses from a different (usually preceding) epidemic (i.e., swine-to-swine transmission) (IV).
comparisons between the internal gene segments and H1-pdm and N1-pdm, because not all viruses are whole-genome sequenced by USDA surveillance. Therefore, the lower absolute number of human-to-swine transmission events inferred on the NP phylogeny (Fig. 2b, quadrant II) compared to the N1-pdm (Fig. 2a) and H1-pdm (see Fig. S4 in the supplemental material) phylogenies, respectively, more likely reflects the lower number of available NP sequences from swine (see Tables S2 to S4 in the supplemental material). However, a more meaningful comparison is the number of onward transmissions in swine (quadrant IV) compared to human-to-swine transmissions (quadrant II). This proportion is much higher for the NP-pdm segment than for H1-pdm and N1-pdm, reflecting the higher onward swine-toswine transmission of NP-pdm in swine via reassortment with endemic swine viruses (described below).
Reassortment between pH1N1 viruses and other cocirculating swIAVs. The relatively low levels of onward transmission of H1-pdm and N1-pdm, paired with higher levels for onward transmission of pandemic internal genes in swine, indicate that the H1-pdm and N1-pdm segments are frequently being replaced by reassortment with other HA and NA antigens circulating in U.S. swine (e.g., H3, H1-␥, H1-␦1, N1-classical, and N2-2002) ( Fig. 3 ; see Table S8 in the supplemental material). USDA conducts swIAV surveillance through a voluntary and passive syndromic system that is not necessarily an unbiased representation of swIAV diversity in the United States at the population level, making it difficult to estimate the prevalence of segments with different evolutionary origins. Still, among 444 whole-genome sequences from U.S. swIAVs collected from 2009 to 2014, no viruses were identified with a H1-pdm segment and at least one nonpandemic segment, and only one virus was identified that contained an N1-pdm segment and another segment of nonpandemic origin (see Table S8 in the supplemental material). This pattern suggests that the H1-pdm and N1-pdm segments were rarely retained following reassortment events between pH1N1 and other swine viruses. In contrast, the pH1N1 internal gene segments are frequently retained following reassortment events, as reflected by the large number and diversity of reassortant viruses containing pH1N1 internal gene segments, particularly PA-pdm, NP-pdm, and MPpdm ( Fig. 3 ; see Table S8 in the supplemental material). There is evidence that viruses with all eight genome segments of pH1N1 origin may be transmitted transiently in swine following humanto-swine transmission (e.g., A/sw/Minnesota/165A/2009/H1N1 and A/sw/Minnesota/074A/2009/H1N1, indicated by a black arrow in Fig. S5 in the supplemental material) . However, over time, the eight-segment pH1N1 genotype is rapidly broken up by reassortment with other swIAVs, in almost all cases losing the H1-pdm and N1-pdm segments. Although global reassortment patterns were not formally analyzed in our U.S.-focused study, higher onward transmission of pH1N1 internal gene segments was also observed in other countries, including China, relative to H1-pdm and N1-pdm (representative PB2 phylogeny is shown in Fig. S6 in the supplemental material).
Human-to-swine transmission is associated with pH1N1 activity in humans. The frequency of human-to-swine transmission was found to be temporally associated with pH1N1 activity in humans in the United States, as measured by the proportion of respiratory samples tested by the U.S. CDC that were pH1N1 positive from 2009 to 2014 (Fig. 4) . Major peaks in pH1N1 activity in humans in the United States occurred in late 2009 and again during the winter of 2013-2014, which corresponds to seasons with high numbers of human-to-swine transmission events (Fig. 4) . Deviations from the apparent association, such as the high number of human-to-swine transmission events, inferred during 2010 and 2011, when pH1N1 activity in humans in the United States was low, are explained by deeper examination of the data. A heat map of the H1-pdm segment with greater temporal resolution (see Fig. S4 in the Table S5 in the supplemental material), with a year-long lag in detection owing to gaps in surveillance in swine that are apparent in the phylogeny (see 
DISCUSSION
The dissemination of pH1N1 viruses from humans to swine has been a global phenomenon and arguably represents the largestscale reverse zoonosis of pathogens from humans to animals documented to date. Since 2009, pH1N1 viruses and pH1N1 reassortants (i.e., viruses with at least one segment of pH1N1 origin) have been identified in swine populations in the Americas (United States [20] , Canada [21] , Mexico [22] , Argentina [6] , Brazil [23] , and Colombia [24] ), Europe (United Kingdom [25] , Germany [26] , Norway [8] , and Italy [27] ), Asia (China [3] , South Korea [28] , Sri Lanka [10] , Thailand [29] , and Vietnam [7] ), Africa (4), and Australia (5). We previously estimated that the pH1N1 virus was introduced at least 49 times from humans to swine on a global scale (9) . The earlier global estimate was based on limited availability of swIAV sequence data that were restricted to the period 2009 to 2012 and that underrepresented many regions. The methods used were conservative and based on high bootstrap values, and the resulting estimate was admittedly a lower bound. Using similarly conservative methods but including a newer data set that contained recently obtained sequences from 2013 and 2014, our analysis of the H1-pdm phylogeny, as expected, identified a larger number of virus introductions. In fact, we estimated that 38 human-to-swine transmissions occurred from 2009 to 2014 in the United States alone. Our Bayesian analysis using Markov jumps suggests that this number could be considerably higher. Critically, our investigation demonstrates that human-to-swine transmission of pH1N1 has continued to occur in the United States during recent seasonal epidemics of pH1N1 and is likely to continue to recur as long as pH1N1 circulates as a seasonal influenza virus in humans.
The large-scale introduction of pH1N1 virus from humans to swine has had a major impact on the diversity of IAVs in swine globally. The pH1N1 viruses have reassorted extensively with other cocirculating swIAVs, generating a diversity of new reassortant viruses with novel combinations of genome segments (3, 20, 26) . In the United States, one of the new genotypes that resulted from reassortment with pH1N1 viruses is H3N2v, with a high profile in 2011 and 2012, which was a triple-reassortant H3N2 virus that acquired the MP-pdm segment. This particular H3N2v genotype is notable because it has been associated with Ͼ330 human infections since 2011, mostly in children attending agricultural fairs (30) . Although the largest number of cases occurred during the summer of 2012, with fewer cases observed during 2013 and 2014, the equivalent H3N2 virus continues to circulate in U.S. swine populations, and the risk of another major outbreak in the future remains.
The high onward transmission of pandemic internal genes in U.S. swine populations is notable, given the previous decades of strong dominance of the triple-reassortant internal-gene "TRIG" constellation since their emergence in the mid-1990s. The high level of detection of the MP-pdm segment, which is originally of Eurasian avian-like virus origin and highly genetically divergent from the TRIG MP, is particularly notable in the United States, both for the expansion of genetic diversity and for the evolution of the H3N2v variants isolated in humans that contain this segment (31) . The population dynamics of swIAVs remain poorly understood, including why certain segments and segment combinations are transmitted more efficiently than others in pigs and how this relates to viral fitness and severity of clinical illness. Particularly perplexing is why the H1-pdm and N1-pdm segments do not appear to sustain transmission in swine. The fact that eight-segment pH1N1 viruses do not sustain transmission in U.S. swine herds raises important questions about where and how a virus with unclear fitness in pigs in field settings could have caused a pandemic in humans. Whole-genome sequencing and population-based surveillance with minimized bias are central to understanding viral fitness at a genomic level, along with experimental studies of transmission and pathology.
The CDC recommends that all healthy people over the age of 6 months receive the seasonal influenza vaccine. However, despite the clear relationship between human and swine IAVs and the dramatic role that human seasonal IAV has played in driving the genetic diversity of IAV in swine (32) , swine workers and veterinarians are not considered to be a priority for human seasonal or pandemic vaccines (33) . The swine industry recommends vaccination of swine workers, as well as sick leave policies for workers with influenza-like illness (34) , but there are no public reports available to indicate compliance with these recommendations. Since human pH1N1 virus in its entirety is virulent in pigs (35, 36) and would more likely be captured by the USDA syndromic surveillance than an avirulent or weakly pathogenic virus, such as a human-adapted seasonal H3N2 or pre-2009 H1N1 virus, the pH1N1 virus human-to-swine transmission episodes we describe here provide an optimal example to reinforce the human influenza vaccine recommendations within the pork industry. Although gaps in sequence data from the U.S. swine population are apparent, surveillance has been greatly intensified since 2009, allowing these important observations in IAV evolution and population dynamics. The results reported here and elsewhere (11) underscore the value of the national surveillance system and the need to sustain these efforts beyond the initial 2009 H1N1 pandemic response.
